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FEDERAL TAXATION OF TRUSTS
By ED. R. MOYLAN, of the Denver Bar.

N 1932, a wealthy citizen of Colorado, let us call him
John Jones, desiring that his minor daughter in her more
mature years might have an income, set up an irrevocable
trust for that purpose, naming a Denver bank as the trustee.
The income therefrom was to be accumulated and added to
the principal until the time of distribution. The instrument
comprising the trust contained inter alia, this provision, of
more or less common usage:
"The income from the trust shall be accumulated and added to the
principal until the termination of this trust provided that Celiste Jones,
who was twelve years of age on August 1, 1932, may at any time after
attaining the age of 27 years, request that the income arising after the
date of her request be paid to her as long as she may live, and provided
further that if at any time before the said Celiste Jones attains the age
of 27 years, her support and education is not sufficiently provided for
from other sources, the trustee may from time to time pay any income
thereafter arising from the trust fund to or for the benefit of the said
Celiste Jones, upon the approval of the Trustor or his wife, or without
such approval if neither the Trustor or his wife be living."

In the latter part of 1936 an agent from the Denver Division, Department of Internal Revenue, examined into the
setup of this trust and thereafter sent a copy of his report
thereon to the trustee.
The agent stated in his report that this was an irrevocable
trust; that it was for the benefit of the minor child; that the
trustor had no power to alter or modify any provision thereof,
but his report contained the following pertinent statement:
"Inasmuch as the income of this trust may be used for the support
and maintenance of this minor daughter, the income is taxable to the
grantor under the provisions of Section 167, Revenue Act of 1934."

No tax liability had been shown on the trustee's return for
two years for the' reason that the income reported was insufficient in amount and kind to be reached by the tax.
The trustor was already paying an income tax that reached
into the high surtax brackets, making these additional taxes
on the income from the trust a considerable burden. Immediately thereafter the trustor's attorney filed a protest on this
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assessment with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on the theory
that, as the trustor retained no title to the property conveyed
by the trust instrument, no control over the terms of the
trust and no interest in the distribution of the trust income,
the tax was arbitrary and unlawful.
Counsel further set forth that the gift to the minor
daughter was present, executed and outright, and that the
gift-tax thereon had been assessed and paid and further argued
that to establish the contention that the income from the
property of this irrevocable trust (the application of such income being for the benefit of others), was nevertheless the
income of the trustor and might lawfully be taxed as his
property, required something more tangible than a mere supposition that in the distant future, some part of the income
of this trust might be used to discharge a legal obligation of
the trustor i. e. the support of his child. He pointed out that
the trustor was not bound to set aside a trust fund for his
minor child. He was, it is true, charged with her support but
he was not further charged.
The agent's interpretation was claimed to be arbitrary
and irrational. The line of demarkation between the rational
and the arbitrary in legislation, it was pointed out, was not to
be drawn with an eye to remote possibilities. 1. *
The agent in charge in Denver sustained the agent who
assessed the tax basing his decision on the language of the
Supreme Court in recently decided cases. 2.*
Jones' counsel contended that the decisions depended on
by the taxing authority were not in point with his case and
were distinguished from it in the following particulars:
1. Jones had created an irrevocable trust.
2. He had divested himself of every incident of control
over the trust estate.
3. He could not on the happening of any contingency
have a reversion of the corpus of the trust.
1.* Barnett vs. Wells, 289 U. S. 670.
2.* Douglas vs. Willcuts, 290 U. S. 56 Supreme Court 58.
Helvering vs. Blumenthal, 56 Supreme Court 305.
Commissioner vs. Stokes, 56 Supreme Court 308.
Commissioner vs. Schweitzer, 56 Supreme Court 304.
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The statute provides that the income of the trust is taxable to the beneficiary if the following three requirements are
met:
1. The income must be income from property held in
trust.
2. The trust must not be a revocable trust.
3. The trust must not provide that the income be distributed to the grantor, or accumulated for future distribution
to the grantor in his discretion either alone or in conjunction
with one not a beneficiary. To the extent that any part of
the income of the trust is so distributed or accumulated, such
part of the income is taxable to the grantor.*
(The tax to the beneficiary would be greatly less than if
assessed to the trustor on account of the latters high surtax.)
The sections of the statute which impose the second and third
requirements above set forth were intended to apply to actual
transfers of property to trustees where certain substantial
rights to or control over the property or income therefrom
were retained by the grantor.
Congress undoubtedly intended by the enactment of these
provisions to prevent a taxpayer from reducing, or altogether
avoiding his income tax liability by the creation of a trust to
hold income-producing property and the retention of a power
which would enable him at will, to withdraw the property
or direct the payment of the income to himself. Securities
First National Bank of Los Angeles Exes. 28 B. T. A. 288.
Counsel citing this case demanded to know on what
theory the Internal Revenue Department arrived at its decision, that Jones should be taxed on the income of the trust
he had set up, and on the property rights he had divested
himself of in order that this property should produce income
to take care of his daughter.
Income taxable by virtue of the Sixteenth Amendment
had been clearly defined by the United States Supreme Court.
Derived income was stated to be the indispensable characteristic of taxable income. 4.*
*Sec. 167, Revenue Act, 1934.
4.* Eisner vs. Macomber, 40 Supreme Court 193.
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Hence counsel asked how could Jones have derived any
income from this trust, unless he applied part, at least, of the
trust income to the support of his daughter. The highest
court had declared that in tax cases, as in all others, facts must
not be slighted in favor of suppositions.
An outstanding fact was that no income of the trust was
ever devoted to the support of Jones' daughter.
The only theory on which Jones was taxed was that the
trust agreement provided that at some future time, before the
beneficiary reached the age on which distribution was to be
made to her, should she not receive from other sources enough
for her support and maintenance, then and in that event the
trustee should pay the income to her. The fact that the trust
agreement contained such a clause was by the Bureau deemed
a benefit to the trustor, and the Bureau sought to tax such a
benefit. When we speak of taxing benefits, we venture into
the realm of economics, but economists' definitions of income
have been previously rejected by the Supreme Court of the
United States. 5.*
It is not yet the law that all economic benefits, no matter
how contingent or remote, constitute taxable income. This
theory finally prevailed.
On July 28, 1937, while the office of general counsel was
occupied by a distinguished member of the Denver Bar the
widely discussed case of Black vs. Commissioner came before
the Board of Tax Appeals. It is reported in 36 B. T. A.,
page 346. The facts are as follows:
The Commissioner determined a deficiency of $2,559.56
in petitioner's individual income tax for 1934. Aside from
minor adjustments, which are not assailed, the Commissioner
included in petitioner's income $8,000.00 on dividends on
corporate shares held by four trusts created by petitioner in
1933, of each which petitioner's wife and three minor children were the respective beneficiaries. This ruling was duly
protested.
The Board of Tax Appeals in upholding the taxpayer's
contention said:
5.* Eisner vs. Macomber, 40 Supreme Court 193.
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1. "We are of the opinion that the Commissioner's determination
is in error. The trusts were complete and irrevocable. Petitioner had
no right to the income either presently or prospectively and none of it
actually came to him. He did not benefit by its use for the support and
maintenance of his wife and children or in the discharge of his own obligations (Cf Commissioner vs. Grosvenor, 85 Fed.) (2), and the trusts
were at all times administered with a strict regard for their separate
jural personalities. There is no occasion, therefore, to regard the income
as constructively received by Petitioner."
Judgment was entered under Rule 50.
Shortly after the decision in the Black case this very pertinent memo issued from the office of the General Counsel:
(2) G. M. C. 18972, XV-33
8882 (p- 6 ):
"The next question to be considered is what part, if any, of the
income of trusts is taxable to the grantor under Section 167 of the
Revenue Acts of 1933 and 1934? * * * This office has reached
the conclusion that in cases where the trust income or at least part of it
might in the discretion of the trustee have been used to support the minor
children of the grantor, there should be taxed to the grantor only so
much of the trust's income as is actually distributed for the support
and maintenance of the beneficiaries whom the grantor is legally obliged
to support. The fact that the trust's income may be distributed for the
support of such persons (but actually is not) does not make any such
income subject to distribution to the grantor within the meaning of
Section 167 of the Revenue Acts herein involved. The opinion in E. E.
Black promulgated by the Board of Tax Appeals on July 28, 1937,
36 B.T.A. No. 55 (p. 346). Acquiescence published on page 1 of this
bulletin clearly states the rule."
In view of the above decision and memo the protest of
Jones' Counsel prevailed and Jones' income was not subjected
to the tax.

The General Counsel who wrote this memo, defining the
future course of the department, thus putting at rest the mind
of many a harassed taxpayer, is no longer with the Internal

Revenue Department.* He also saw fit to disagree with some
of its other policies and is again engaged in the general practice of law having won high esteem for his independence and

legal ability before resigning.
*Hon. Morrison Shafroth.

REFUGE OF A ROGUE
By WM.

HEDGES ROBINSON, JR.,

RUNO RICHARD HAUPTMANN

of the Denver Bar.
staked his life and his

freedom on three alibis, and lost.
The first official notice that Hauptmann was to rely
on alibis for his defense came when Mr. Fisher, one of his
counsel, said at the opening of the defense testimony: "We
submit that in our defense we will attempt, and we believe
successfully, to prove to you a complete alibi for the defendant
Hauptmann on each and every occasion that he has been
named as being present at a given point."
Until Hauptmann took the stand, the prosecution had no
idea what those alibis would be; and until the witnesses to
those alibis had testified, the attorney-general and his staff
had no knowledge who would testify, nor to what. This
lack of knowledge was a tremendous handicap, for the prosecution had little or no time to check the history-and character
of these witnesses nor to investigate the accuracy of the alibis.
One of the favorite defenses of the criminal is an alibi.
It is usually introduced as the last bit of testimony in the defendant's case. It is almost impossible for a prosecutor to
meet this evidence because he is totally unaware of what is
coming, of what stories he must be able to refute.
In the Hauptmann case, for example, over a dozen people
paraded to the witness chair in the closing days of the trial
to establish the three alibis Hauptmann had set up. He swore
that on the evening of the kidnapping he was in Christian
Fredricksen's bakery until nine o'clock waiting for his wife,
and that thereafter he went home, not to leave the house
again that night. He swore that on the evening the ransom
money was paid in the cemetery, he was spending a "moosical" evening at home with friends. He swore that when the
ransom bills were passed in November, 1932, he was many
miles from the place where the bills were circulated.
In addition to his wife's testimony attempting to establish these alibis, about a dozen other witnesses tried to build
up these stories. Fortunately, David Wilentz and his staff
were able to show the jury that many of the defense witnesses
42
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were convicted criminals, dope fiends, and psychopathics, and
that there was little possibility of any truth in their narratives.
The evidence that was secured concerning these witnesses
had to be secured quickly, and undoubtedly much more could
have been disclosed if Mr. Wilentz had had time to prepare
it. But more frequently the prosecutor has neither the resources nor even a short time to check both the alibi witness
and his story. He must meet this defense instantly in the
middle of a trial, without any preparation whatsoever. In
such a case there is frequently a gross miscarriage of justice.
Another criminal is turned loose to garrote society.
Fortunately, there has been a recent tendency to protect
society against the criminal instead of placing all the odds in
favor of the criminal. Heretofore most all of the protection
has been placed about the criminal, while society stands bare
and defenseless. Before a case goes to trial, for example, the
state is compelled by law to allege specifically the offense and
to furnish the defendant with the names of his witnesses. The
defendant simply pleads guilty or not guilty. He does not
even suggest the nature of his defense nor who his witnesses
may be. The defense attorneys have a good opportunity to
check the state's allegations and its witnesses from every angle.
On the other hand, the state must be prepared to meet
the unknown, both as to the nature of the defense and as to
the antecedents, character, and reliability of its supporting
witnesses. Obviously, this is an impossible task for any prosecutor. The result is that many a criminal comes to court with
perjured alibi testimony and escapes the law.
To overcome this difficulty, a law was enacted in Michigan
in 1927 which provided that not less than four days before
the trial the defendant should serve upon the prosecuting
attorney a notice of the intention to claim an alibi, setting
forth specific information as to the place at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense. Ohio
enacted a similar law in 1929, and Wisconsin followed in
1934.
The soundness of this law was recognized by the American Bar Associaticm, which in its annual meeting in 1934
approved the principle. Since that date the Association has
continually urged states to enact similar laws. Under the
direction of the Association, some 150 local bar associations
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are studying this measure, as well as other reforms in criminal
law, and have caused its introduction into 18 legislatures in
the 1935 session. At least 8 states and the federal government
have recently added this act to their statutes.
The advantage of this law is apparent. State and defendant are placed upon equal footing. There is no longer a sudden popping up of witnesses to swear the defendant out of
his troubles. There is a noticeable reduction in perjury.
Michigan and Ohio should by this time have been a good
proving ground. How has the alibi defense law worked in
practice there? In Detroit since the passage of the act alibi
defenses are very few. A good percentage of those offered
have been proved false and convictions have followed. Police
and prosecuting officials state that the great increase in convictions where alibis have been offered since the passage of the
act is due to the opportunity they have to inquire into the
facts of the alleged alibi and to refute and destroy those which
are false.
Ohio reports nearly the same experience. Shortly after
the new law became effective, the number of alibi defenses
offered decreased very noticeably; and in a short time were
being used only in a minimum number of cases.
The effectiveness of the alibi defense law is thus demonstrated by actual practice. It means that wherever the law
is in force, there is no longer a sudden flood of unknown witnesses to testify that the accused was not at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission and thus throw a reasonable doubt on the testimony of state witnesses. Criminals,
as well as their lawyers, in these three states are impressed by
the fact that an alibi defense refuted in open court is worse
than no defense at all.
In those states where there is no alibi defense law, witnesses continue to appear with startling suddenness at the
close of a trial. Any volume of law reports will disclose some
of these interesting and ingenious alibi defenses which are
without warning sprung on the prosecution.
For example, in a recent case a defendant was charged
with burglarizing a freight depot at Celeste, Texas, and taking some shoes and pocket knives. Soon after the burglary
the defendant was found selling these goods. On the last day
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of the trial the defendant pleaded that he won the shoes and
pocket knives in a game of chance in a filling station in
Leonard, Texas, and had witnesses to prove it. A judge
reviewing the case observed with caustic emphasis that the
defendant, though he had frequent opportunities to do so,
said nothing about the alibi until the last day of the trial.
The most frequent of the alibi defenses, however, is the
somewhere else" plea. To establish his innocence, a defendant will offer evidence that he was somewhere else than the
scene of the crime and will offer testimony of his wife, "Moll,"
relatives or friends to prove it.
A typical instance of such a defense is a recent Missouri
case. The teller of a bank which had been robbed identified
the defendants as the hold-up men. The defendants each had
an alibi. One said he had stayed at his father's home, then
had visited his brother, and the day after the crime had left
for New Orleans. Of course, the family all concurred in this
alibi. The second defendant established his alibi by one of
his relatives who testified that defendant had stayed at his
home continuously a day before and until two days after the
robbery, and then had departed for Cleveland. The relative
brought a postal card purportedly sent by the accused several
days later from Cleveland.
The postal card is a favorite trick of criminals. Gang
members can easily mail cards from any desired city, thereby making possible an alibi. In fact, there is one legitimate
firm that will guarantee to mail letters for one from every
part of the world. It is a very simple trick, but may be effective with a jury by casting a reasonable doubt into their
minds. Along with such alibis goes the forged hotel register,
the faked photograph, and other similar manufactured evidence.
Manufactured alibis have offered one of the simplest and
easiest avenues of escape for the criminal. Besides escape,
it has encouraged perjury and thereby added a considerable
item to unpunished crime.
The days when men went about the English halls of
justice with straws in their sandals indicating their willingness to testify to anything for a fee, are not so far removed
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from the present. Criminals may not expose the straws in
their shoes, but their footwear is pretty well lined with straw.
It is estimated that perjured testimony occurs in about
75% to 90% of the criminal cases. Yet only .009 of the
criminal cases in New York in one year were for perjury, and
the percentage seems to follow throughout the country. The
reasons why perjury is so infrequently punished are the technicalities of the law, the hesitancy on the part of judges to
commit witnesses suspected of perjury, the apathy of prosecuting attorneys, the refusal of grand juries to indict and
petit juries to convict, and the severe but ineffective punishment provided by law.
In the Hauptmann case, a goodly percentage of the testimony attempting to establish the alibis was undoubtedly
perjured. Prosecutions of four witnesses offering perjured
testimony are planned.
A recent Virginia case indicates the manner in which much
alibi testimony is manufactured. A certain Mrs. Mundy had
been indicted for selling liquor at a tearoom which she managed. The state claimed that two prohibition officers purchased drinks from her at eight o'clock on the evening of
December 10, 1931. Her alibi was that on that night at
seven-thirty she left her car to be repaired in a garage at Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, and that the repairs were not
completed until nine o'clock. The garage man produced
memo charges and book entries to bolster the alibi, and Mrs.
Mundy was acquited.
Unfortunately for Mrs. Mundy, however, the presiding
judge believed the testimony was perjured and he ordered that
she be tried for offering false testimony. On the perjury trial,
it developed that the supposed garage man did not own a
garage and had never repaired her car. As a matter of fact, he
was unemployed and had testified along the lines suggested by
Mrs. Mundy, who had caused the necessary books to be prepared. Needless to say, Mrs. Mundy was convicted of perjury.
This example is not an uncommon one. The only thing
uncommon about the Mundy trial was that she was convicted
of perjury. Faked alibis are offered every day in court.
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Judge Wilkerson of the Federal District Court in Chicago
made this striking statement in the D'Andrea contempt of
court case: (D'Andrea, you may remember, was Capone's
bodyguard.)
"From that camp (Capone's), under what coercive influences we can only conjecture from what transpired in court,
came that array of shocking perjury with which the court was
confronted during the closing days of trial. We had here the
spectacle of (alibi) witness after witness testifying in a way
which was psychologically impossible, pretending to remember things which in the very nature of the human mind the
witness could not have remembered if he had forgotten the
things which he pretended to have forgotten. It was perjury
on the face of it."
What took place in Judge Wilkerson's court that day
occurs in practically every court of the land, especially where
the defendant is permitted unlimited heights to concoct an
alibi. This "array of shocking perjury" can be eliminated
to a large extent by the alibi defense law which the American
Bar Association and the Association of Grand Jurors of New
York County are urging the various states to enact into law.
Mr. Wilentz, who is a firm believer of the advance notice
of alibi law, is frequently asked why he did not invoke the
recent New Jersey alibi defense law in the Hauptmann trial.
In so important a case as that one he did not dare to inject
constitutional questions into the case at the cost of the taxpayer. The law had never been tested in the New Jersey
courts, although it has been approved in both Michigan and
Ohio. Secondly, the New Jersey law does not follow the
terms of the usual alibi defense law, and its usefulness has to
a large measure been nullified by an unusual provision which
gives the defendant a chance to offer additional rebuttal witnesses (should the alibi be perjured) to counteract any investigation the state may undertake.
The alibi defense law is not proposed as a panacea for
all the ills of criminal law. It has two obvious merits: It
permits the state to be as well prepared as the defense, and
it tends in a large measure to eliminate perjury. It is an aid
in promoting the ends of justice, and as one writer has recently said, it is "indicative of the manner in which revision
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and modernization of archaic codes of criminal procedure
may serve to make the criminal law what it is intended to be,
'A sword for the guilty and a shield for the innocent'." To
anyone familiar with criminal procedure, there comes the
realization that our past tendency has been to safeguard the
criminal against society by placing all sorts of technicalities
and obstructions in his hands. It is high time that we now
safeguard society against the criminal, and give both society
and the accused an even break.
NOTHING NEW UNDER THE SUN
By HON.

FOSTER CLINE,

of S. E. C.

Since I am no longer in general practice and very seldom
file pleadings of any kind in the courts, it may be safe for me
to submit for your consideration as an interesting article for
DICTA the following quotations from a decision in 1568
concerning, the great length of pleadings, in which the Chancellor observed:
"that the said replication (i. e., the pleading) doth amount to six score
sheets of paper and yet all the matter thereof which is pertinent might
have been well contrived in sixteen sheets of paper

and gave order
"that the Warden of the Fleet shall take the said Richard Mylward (the
culprit pleader) alias Alexander into his custody and shall bring him
into Westminster Hall on Saturday next about 10 of the clock in the
forenoon and then and there shall cut a hole in the midst of the same
engrossed Replication which is delivered unto him for that purpose, and
put the said Richard's head through the same hole, and so let the same
Replication hang about his shoulders with the written side hanging outward, and then, the same so hanging, shall lead the said Richard bareheaded and barefaced round about Westminster Hall whilst the Courts
are sitting, and shall show him at the Bar of every of the three Courts
within the Hall, and then shall take him back again to the Fleet, and
keep him prisoner until he shall have paid lb 10 to her Majesty for a
fine and 20 nobles to the defendant for his costs in respect of the aforesaid abuse."
"All we know of freedom, all we use or know
This our fathers bought for us long and long ago;
Ancient right, unnoticed as the breath we draw
Leave to live by no man's leave, underneath the law;
Lance, and torch, and tumult, steel and gray, goose wing
Wrenched them inch, and ell, and all, slowly from the King."

WATER RIGHTS-TAXATION AS IMPROVEMENT UPON REALTYCORPORATION STOCK IN MUTUAL DITCH COMPANY-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Beaty vs. Board of County Commissioners of
Otero County-No. 14031--Decided November 15, 1937-District Court of Otero County-Hon. William B. Stewart, JudgeAffirmed.
Facts: From 1927 to 1932, plaintiff owned 458 acres of land,
all lying under a canal owned by a mutual ditch company. For irrigation of the land, she owned 477.44 shares of stock in the ditch company.
The by-laws of the company contemplated that one share of stock represented the amount of water required to irrigate one acre of land. During
each of the years involved, part of plaintiff's land was not irrigated by
reason of seepage or some other condition interfering with cultivation.
The plaintiff, therefore, at all times owned more shares of water stock
than she owned acres of irrigated and cultivated land. She, because of
this, used and enjoyed the use of more water per acre than persons having
only one share for each acre of land. During each of these years the
irrigated acreage of plaintiff was assessed as irrigated lands, and at an
amount equal to the valuation placed upon other like lands having one
share of stock or less per acre for the irrigation thereof. Also, her right
to the use of additional water was assessed as improvements on land on
the basis of the number of shares of canal stock she had in excess of the
number of acres of irrigated land assessed to her. These assessments
appeared in that column of the plaintiff's tax schedule headed: "Improvements on land," using the descriptive words: "--- sh. extra (or ex.)
water," followed by the varying valuation fixed for the respective years.
Plaintiff voluntarily paid the taxes so levied, except those for 1932,
without protest, and took no action of any kind, until 1933, when she
applied for a refund of taxes paid and an abatement of the 1932 tax.
The County Commissioners denied the application, and she prosecuted
this action in the District Court, which held the excess or extra stock
was assessable.
1. The proceeding could be disposed of adversely to
HELD:
plaintiff for her failure to avail herself of the administrative statutory
remedies for relief from the allegedly illegal assessments, and for her
failure to protest and refuse to pay the taxes.
The thing assessed for taxation was not corporate stock, but
2.
an improvement on real estate. Where a mutual canal company was
organized for the convenience of its members in the distribution to them
of their water for use upon their lands in proportion to their respective
interests, the stock certificates are merely muniments of title to her water
right and such is unquestionably real estate and not corporate stock.
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3. That the assessor in assessing the excess water rights used the
measuring stick (shares of stock) suggested by the by-laws of the corporation is not to be considered as changing the true character of the
shares.
4. Sec. 3, Article X, of the Colorado Constitution, does not
exempt ditches, canals and flumes used by individuals or corporations
for irrigating land owned by them or it, from taxation, but only requires
that they shall not be separately taxed.
5. Water rights are to be listed and valued for tax purposes as
improvements on the land upon which the water is used.
6.

"*

*

* Under Colorado's theory of taxation the tax value

of farm real estate must vary in direct proportion to the worth and
extent of the improvements to the land, whether they be building, structure, fence or water right."

EN BANC.

. Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous.

Mr. Justice Bouck dissents.

TAX CERTIFICATES-SALES BY COUNTY COMMISSIONERS IN BULKREDEMPTION-REPAYMENT OF FULL AMOUNT PAID UPON
REDEMPTION TO HOLDER OF CERTIFICATE-Board of County

Commissioners of Moffat County, et al. vs. Utah-ColoradoLand
and Livestock Co.-No. 1416 8-Decided November 15, 1937District Court of Moffat County-Hon. Charles E. Herrick, Judge
-Affirmed.
HELD:

1.

Where an officer of a company, desiring to purchase

tax certificates, appeared before the board of County Commissioners at a
regular session with a list of various outstanding tax sale certificates
belonging to the county, with the idea of acquiring at a discount a number of those certificates, and stated what the company would be willing
to pay, certificate by certificate, and in each instance the board, after discussion of the matter, determined the specific amount for which they
would authorize the treasurer to make the assignment, and where in
many instances the price so fixed was in excess of the amount suggested,
and where a resolution was prepared at the request of the board, which
was in regular form with a separate assessment of the purchase price of
each certificate and which did not name the purchaser or place any
restrictions upon the transaction, and where over a period extending
from two weeks to two months thereafter, and during which period
any person could have purchased the tax certificates for the amounts
mentioned in the resolution, the company did purchase certain certificates, there is no evidence of collusion, fraud, or bulk sales of tax certificates, or an attempt to prefer a particular purchaser.
2.
Under these circumstances, the holder of the tax certificate, as
assignee of the county, became vested with the same rights under the
certificates as though it had been the original purchaser at the tax sale,
and, therefore, upon the redemption of the certificates was entitled to
the full amount paid for the redemption thereof. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland dissent.

DICTA
MINORITY STOCKHOLDERS SUITS-MINING CORPORATIONS-RATIFICATION OF ACTS OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS-ENCUMBERING
MINING PROPERTIES OF COMPANY-ESTOPPEL-MacKenzie, etc.

vs. Taggart, etc., et al.-No. 14077-Decided November 15, 1937
-District Court of Teller County-Hon. John M. Meikle, Judge
-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. Where it appears that a meeting of the board of directors of a mining corporation was called and held to consider ways
and means for securing a loan to pay off an indebtedness of the company
secured by a trust deed then being foreclosed, and at such meeting it
was provided that the vice-presidint and secretary issue a trust deed or
use whatever means necessary to secure the amount of money required to
avoid foreclosure, and where it appears that at a subsequently called
shareholders meeting, the action of the board was ratified, and that later
the plaintiff became a stockholder, and thereafter the deed of trust was
executed, and where it appears that following that, a shareholders meeting was held, but not properly called, at which the plaintiff voted by
proxy, together with over 76% of the shareholders to ratify, approve
and adopt the acts of the directors, the plaintiff, as a minority stockholder, may not now bring a suit to set aside a public trustee's deed,
certificate of purchase and the deed of trust issued to defendants.
2. " 'Stockholders who vote in favor of a transaction and their
transferees cannot maintain a suit on behalf of the corporation and other
stockholders to avoid such transaction * * * Where an act done by a
private corporation is not per se illegal, nor malum prohibitium, and is
not a matter of public concern, but merely affects the interests of the
stockholders, the latter may so act as to deprive them'selves of the right
to challenge its validity.' " EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Bouck dissents.

BONDS - PAYMENTS - LIABILITY OF TRUSTEE - Union
Deposit Co. and Union Trust Co. vs. Talbot, etc.-No. 13899Decided November 15, 1937-District Court of Denver-Hon.
George F. Dunklee, Judge-On rehearing, affirmed as to Union
Deposit Company and reversed as to Union Trust Co.
FACTS: District Court entered judgment for $2,634.33 against
the Union Deposit Co. and the Union Trust Co. upon a $2,500 bond
issued by the Deposit Company. It provided that it should be paid for
by certain methods of payments in installments. The plaintiff contended that the bond matured some months before action was commenced and produced an expert and his memorandums showing how
the payments made so matured the bond. The defendants contended
that the suit was premature and produced an expert and memorandum
setting forth their contention. The trial court decided in favor of the
plaintiff and against both defendants. The Trust Company contends
that it was the custodian of certain securities intended to safeguard the
TRUSTS -
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holders of bonds against loss, and is not responsible for the full claim
of the plaintiff.
HELD: 1. Payments made on the bond, including those for the
first year, should be considered as "advance payments" under the provisions of the bond, and, therefore, the maturity date was prior to the
institution of suit and judgment should be entered against the Deposit
Company.
2. A new trial should be held as to the Trust Company, for
there is no showing justifying a holding that a total depletion of securities entrusted to the Trust Company as custodian and trustee, occurred.
The claim against the Trust Company is only because of alleged negligence resulting in loss of the securities by allowing their improper withdrawal. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.

ESTATESHEIRSHIP - AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CONTENDING PARTIES-ESTOPPEL BY CONTRACT-PUBLICI JURIS-SETTLEMENTS OF FAMILY DISPUTES-Estate of Schofield vs. Schofield-

No. 14179-DecidedNovember 15, 1937-DistrictCourt of Larimer County-Hon. Claude C. Coffin, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: G. S. died intestate and childless. The County Court
had declared L. N. S., who claimed as surviving widow, to be the sole
heir. On appeal, the District Court entered a judgment declaring A. F.
S., father of the deceased, to be such sole heir. A. F. S. had filed, in the
County Court, a petition for determination of heirship, naming himself
and L. N. S. as the only two persons who were or claimed to be heirs.
A month later, and two weeks before hearing in County Court, the two
entered into a written agreement whereby the father, in consideration
of certain items and conveyances to him, agreed not to contest the right
of the widow and expressly recognized her as the lawful widow. Counsel for the father argued that it was the absolute legal duty of the County
Court to decide the question of heirship regardless of agreements between the claimants.
HELD: 1. A contract is not against public policy where it
merely involves the descent and distribution of property and its transfer.
2. Such contract is a formal acknowledgment that the other
claimant's right is superior and amounts to an estoppel by contract, and
the father is now estopped to deny such fact as long as the agreement
stands.
3. The contract was intended as a means of settling the legal
controversy between the only possible claimants to heirship. Settlements
of family disputes are strongly favored. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Young dissents.

DICTA
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-State of Coloradovs. La PlataRiver & Cherry

Creek Ditch Co. et al.-No. 14108-Decided November 15, 1937
-District Court of La Plata County-Hon. John B. O'Rourke,
Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Years after a suit between individuals, corporations, etc.,
had been commenced, and after trial to District Court, appeal to State
Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court, the legislature of the
State of Colorado passed an act giving the Governor, in his discretion,
the right to direct the Attorney General to intervene and directing the
Attorney General, in such cases, to intervene in litigation which involves
the construction, validity or constitutionality of any compact between
Colorado and other states. The act also provides, "that no money judgment, either for damages or costs, shall ever be entered against the State
of Colorado in such litigation." One of the parties to the suit moved to
dismiss the state's petition to intervene.
HELD: 1. The statute is unconstitutional as violating Article III
and Section 1 of Article VI of the State Constitution, the former of
which divides the powers of government and the latter vests the judicial
power in the courts.
2. The statute may not forbid the court to give damages against
the state, although it may attach certain limitations to its consent to be
sued. "It may specifiy the courts in which the action may be brought.
the officers who shall represent it, the procedure to be followed, and the
method of satisfaction of judgments. But once it is in, the rights and
remedies of the parties are judicial questions, controlled solely by the
tribunal thus given jurisdiction."
3. The provision of the statute relieving the state from liability
for costs is superfluous. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr.
Justice Young dissent. Mr. Justice Bakke not participating.

BAILMENTS -

EVIDENCE -

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

-

LACHES

-

Estate of Max Schwartz, etc. vs. Silvey-No. 14187-Decided
November 8, 1937-DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon. Otto Bock,
Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Trial court sustained claim of Silvey against estate of
Max Schwartz before the latter's death.
HELD: 1. When the trial court heard competent conflicting evidence, and made a decision thereon, the Supreme Court must assume that
the trial judge was familiar with the rule that testimony based upon
recollection, and interpretation placed upon statements and admissions
of a subsequently deceased person is to be scrutinized with care.
2. Under the facts in this case, the statute of limitations did not
begin to run against the bailor until demand was made upon the administrator for the return of the diamonds and their return refused.

DICTA
3.
Alleged laches is not sustained by the evidence where it discloses the continued existence of the relationship of bailor and bailee and
a recognition of that relationship by the deceased within approximately
two years prior to demand for return of the bailed articles and that a
claim against the estate was filed very shortly after the demand was made.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bakke concur.

QUIET TITLEEVIDENCE-

FIXTURES-

REALTY-

RES GESTAE-

TRUSTEE RELATIONSHIP-

LACHES -BURDEN

OF PROOF-

Seaton-Hayden Mines Co., etc. vs. Renshaw-No. 14222-Decided November 8, 1937-District Court of Clear Creek County
-Hon. Samuel W. Johnson, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Question arose as to whether an air compressor placed on
certain leased mining premises belonged to the assignees of the lessor or
whether it remained personalty and belonged to the lessees. The trial
court held it was a trade fixture and belonged to the lessee.
HELD: 1. "It is true that conversations with a man, since deceased, are generally inadmissible, where the decedent is the sole adverse
party (70 C. J. 278), but not always so. The evidence here shows,
and it was not disputed, that Smith was the agent of the other trustees
in dealing with Renshaw [lessee], consequently, Smith's statements made
shortly after the termination of the extension of the lease and option
were admissible in behalf of either party as part of the res gestae."
2. The defense of laches is not available to one whose position is
not changed by virtue of delinquencies on the part of the opposing party.
3. There is a well-recognized exception to the general rule that
personal property affixed to the realty becomes a part of the latter, that
exception existing between landlord and tenant where the latter installs
trade fixtures on the premises, removable at the expiration of the lease,
or a reasonable time thereafter.
4. Where a heavy piece of machinery, such as a compressor, is set
upon a cement foundation with removable bolts holding it in the cement,
and where, in order to remove it from the building in which it is located,
it is necessary to take out one of the buildings, but, where it is not disputed that the end could be replaced without particular damage to the
building, and where there is an agreement in the lease that all permanent
improvements shall become the property of the lessor and that "tools,
movable mechanical equipment, etc." are to remain the property of the
lessee, the burden is on the lessor to show that the compressor was included in that part of the general language of the lease making it a permanent fixture.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr. Justice Knous and Mr. Justice Holland concur.

DICTA
INTERPLEADER-ADOPTION WHERE CHILD IS OVER 21-EVIDENCE
-INSURANCE-Woods vs. Cook-No. 14215-Decided Novem-

ber 8, 1937-DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon. Otto Bock, Judge
-Affirmed.
FACTS: Pullman Porters Benefit Association, of which decedent
was a member, interpleaded Cook, who claimed certain money as an
adopted daughter of decedent, and Woods, a nephew of decedent, who
also claimed the money, and paid the money into court.
Cook was adopted by the decedent and his wife, through a Juvenile
Court proceedings, but after Cook was over the age of 21 years. There
was testimony that Cook and decedent and his wife lived in the same
premises, and that they were interdependent upon each other and helped
each other out financially. The Illinois statute, controlling in the case,
permits the beneficiary to be "a person or persons upon whom the member is dependent, a person or persons dependent upon the member." The
trial court decided in favor of Cook.
HELD: 1. "Regardless of the lack of jurisdiction of the Juvenile
Court to enter a decree of adoption of a person over twenty-one years of
age, the decree is certainly good evidence of the intention of the parties
to enter into a relationship, which was definitely established and continued over a period of fifteen years, and which was never questioned by any
of the parties to the adoption proceedings."
2. There was ample testimony of dependency so that she came
within the provision of the Illinois statute.
3. The trial court was justified in finding that Woods was not a
nephew of the deceased, for the only evidence adduced to indicate that
he was, was the recitation in one of the changes in beneficiary, which
was repudiated by the decedent himself when the last change of beneficiary was made, in which the decedent named his estate as the alternative
beneficiary.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Young and Mr. Justice Holland concur.

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER -

FORECLOSURE -

NOTES -

IN-

STALLMENTS-ACCELERATION CLAUSE-NOTICE-ACTIONS-

PLEADING-Hendron, et al. vs. Bolander-No. 14076-Decided
November 8, 1937-District Court of Denver-Hon. Charles C.
Sackmann, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Plaintiff held note and trust deed on defendant's property,
which the latter occupied. The note provided for payment at the rate
of $65 per month or more, and contained an acceleration clause, but did
not require notice to the makers if and when the holders decided, upon
default of any payment, to declare the entire principal due and payable.
The plaintiff, upon alleged default, commenced foreclosure proceedings, and bought the property in at the public trustee's sale for the
full original amount of the note, interest and expenses. Subsequently, a
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deed was issued to plaintiff and he instituted, in the Justice Court, a suit
in forcible entry and detainer. The defendants answered, admitting
service of a demand for possession, but denying the other allegations and
pleaded certain matters of equitable character designed to show that they
were entitled to retain possession. The case was certified to the District
Court, and trial had. The trial court, after the plaintiff established a
prima facie right to possession, refused the defendants' offer to prove
that they were not in default of the monthly installments.
HELD: I.
"Clearly a judgment in a forcible entry and detainer
suit cannot go beyond an adjudication of the right to possession as between the parties, except when suit is brought under subdivision 4, ch.
70, sec. 4, 1935 C. S. A., which this one is not, and no relief by way of
accounting or for cancellation of the deed under any circumstances could
be granted to the defendants in the instant proceeding."
2. Even if the tendered proof of payment of certain installments
were allowed, the defendants would still be over $100 in default at the
time foreclosure was commenced.
3. Waiver or estoppel, not being pleaded or suggested by the
answer, and not being embraced in the offer of proof, such theory is not
available to the defendants.
4. Unless the note so provides, no notice of election to accelerate
the maturity of the note upon default of the payment of any installment
is necessary, and the foreclosure proceedings and notice thereof is sufficient.
5. A foreclosure sale is not rendered invalid by the fact, if it be a
fact, that it was made to satisfy an excessive claim. Debtor's relief lies
in some other action.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Young concur.

DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS-POWERS O'F MUNICIPALITIES-TAXING

POWER-MUNICIPAL BONDS-LOCAL AND MUNICIPAL PURPOSE-RES ADJUDICATA-McNichols, etc. vs. City and County
of Denver, etc.-No. 14229-Decided October 27, 1937-District Court of Denver-Hon. George F. Dunklee, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: City Council of Denver adopted an ordinance which
provided for submitting to the taxpayers of Denver the question of incurring a bonded indebtedness of $750,000 to buy land for donation
to the United States to be used by the Federal Government as a site for
an air school and bombing field. The taxpayers approved the issuance
of the bonds. Congress authorized the appropriation of a sum for the
school and authorized the acceptance of the land in Colorado for the
school and field. The City Council then adopted an ordinance providing
for the issuance and sale of the bonds. The Auditor of the City and
County of Denver, an elected official, charged by law with the duty of
protecting the funds of the city and given general auditing powers over
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all finances of the city, commenced an action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act to have the court declare that neither the city nor its
officers had the power to issue any of the bonds or to levy taxes for the
payment thereof, and to determine that he was under no duty to recognize them. Issue was joined by the defendants in error, who requested
the court to declare that the proper officials were empowered to issue the
bonds in question and to declare that the levying of direct ad valorem
taxes on the property of the City and County of Denver to produce sufficient revenue to pay principal and interest of the bonds was lawful.
HELD: 1. The auditor is a proper party to institute these proceedings, and one of the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to
cover a situation of this kind in order to protect investors and others
concerned.
2. A declaratory judgment is res adjudicata as to the validity of
the bonds against all persons, including taxpayers, even though they are
not parties to the suit.
3. The proposed bond issue must be sanctioned as being for a
local and municipal purpose. One of the immediate motivating factors
in the creation of the air school and bombing field here involved is the
providing for employment for those otherwise unable to find gainful
occupation in private industry and who otherwise would of necessity
have to be supported through the medium of doles or direct relief. In
addition, there are numerous incidental benefits. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Burke and Mr. Justice
Holland dissent.
TAXATION-DISTRAINT-ESTATES-PROPERTY

IN CUSTODIA LEGIS

-McGuire us. Martyrn Schwartz-No. 14181-Decided October
25, 1937-DistrictCourt of Denuer-Hon. Otto Bock, JudgeReversed and remanded.
FACTS: X pledged jewelry with S, who is since deceased. City
found that jewelry had not been taxed and placed same on rolls for
years 1933 to 1936, inclusive. In a suit between X and the administrator of S, the jewelry was deposited in court and X given 90 days to
redeem. X failed to redeem and the property vested in the administrator.
City issued a distraint warrant and served a copy on the clerk of the
District Court. Administrator had a citation issue against city to show
cause as to why the distraint should not be declared void.
HELD: The lien which attached on the discovery and assessment
of the jewelry operated retroactively so as to be enforceable for the years
1933 to 1936. This is provided for by Section 3, Chapter 142, page
712, Volume 4, 1935 C. S. A. The burden was on the administrator
to show that the property was properly omitted from the rolls, which
burden the administrator failed to fulfill.
The fact that the jewelry was in custodia legis did not void the
distraint warrant as to the taxes for 1937. This does not mean that
the collector can forcibly seize the property in the hands of the court,
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nor is such seizure necessary. The purpose of the distraint in the, instant
case was to notify the court of the taxes due on the property being held
by it.
If the foregoing were not the law, a person could lift property out
of the tax lists by the simple process of a mortgage. IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Knous concur.

BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS-RECEIVERSHIP-ASSIGNMENTS
-APPEAL AND ERROR-Marker vs. City Savings, Building and
Loan Association-No. 14135-DecidedOctober 25, 193 7-District Court of El Paso County-Hon. Arthur Cornforth, JudgeReversed.
FACTS: Receiver appointed for Building and Loan Association,
and the trial court entered an order that each claimant "has an interest"
in the net assets of the association. Thereafter one of the co-receivers
became the assignee of a number of distributive shares of interest in the
association. The court ordered that all persons claiming by assignment
file with the court a verified petition, etc. The co-receiver complied with
the order and upon hearing his claims under 34 assignments were disallowed. He petitioned for a rehearing, and the court, without taking
evidence, denied the petition. The co-receiver thereupon filed a petition
for leave to sue the co-receivers and original claimants for the purpose of
establishing his rights in and to the claims which he held by assignment.
This petition was heard instanter and denied. The plaintiff assigned
error to the orders, disallowing the claims and denying leave to sue the
receivers and assignors.
HELD: 1. The interest of a member of a building and loan
association is assignable.
2. Where the trial court decrees that a claimant, who has presented allowable claims, has an interest in the assets of the association,
such interests may be assigned after the interest has been adjudicated in
a receivership proceeding; and this may be done without first having the
assignment submitted to the court.
3. The primary concern of a receiver is the claim and its amount
as a liability against the assets of the association, and the personnel of
the claimants is a secondary matter, in the distribution of its assets.
4. The court may not displace a lien vested by a contract of assignment; neither could it prevent such a contract.
5. The order disallowing plaintiff's claims followed by one denying a rehearing on the matter of the allowance thereof, was a final determination by the trial court, and, of course, is subject to review. The
order denying plaintiff's request to sue the co-receivers and original claimants was not a preliminary matter, but a final order.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Knous and Mr. Justice Bakke concur.

DICTA
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-MINOR SISTER AS DEPENDENT-Empire Zinc Company vs. Industrial Commission, et al.-No. 14220
-Decided November 22, 1937-District Court of Eagle County
-Hon. William H. Luby, Judge-Affirmed.
1. The Workmen's Compensation Act contemplates that a minor
sister may be a "dependent" under the terms of the act, and entitled to
the benefits of it.
2.
There is no presumption of dependency from the fact that the
claimant is a sister and a minor; the burden is upon her to establish
dependency.
3.
Where it appears that the deceased was the sole support of the
family, that the mother and father has predeceased him, that he had
promised to assist her in obtaining training which would fit her to become a nurse, and that she relied thereon, the trial court's holding that
she was dependent within the terms of the Workmen's Compensation
Act will not be disturbed, although it is shown that death of decedent
took place a month or two after her graduation from high school and he
had made no payment to her during such period.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bakke concur.
CONVERSION - NOTES - DEED OF TRUST - FORECLOSURE - REAL
PROPERTY -PLEADING
SET-OFF - Mangini vs. Dando Company-No. 1413 1-Decided November 22, 1937-DistrictCourt
of City and County of Denver-Hon. Frederic W. Clark, JudgeReversed.
FACTS: Plaintiff brought suit for conversion of $3,000 note and
trust deed, claimed by her to have been left with the president of defendant company for her protection under an agreement with the president
of the company (who has since died) that it would be returned to her
upon demand, since it had been paid. The trust deed had never been
released of record. The defendant claimed ownership of the instruments
and sought to foreclose the deed of trust, through its answer and crosscomplaint. The trial court sustained defendant's motion for nonsuit
and entered judgment of foreclosure of deed of trust on defendant's
cross-complaint.
HELD:
1. Where plaintiff's action is one at law for conversion.
in considering whether the evidence offered by her supports such a cause
of action, the court is not concerned with the purposes that motivated
plaintiff and president of the company in placing the note and deed of
trust in the files of the company so as to give them the appearance of a
valid and subsisting obligation.
2.
Evidence examined and found, if believed, to sustain the allegations in the complaint.
3.
Judgment of foreclosure must be reversed, for if plaintiff recovers on retrial, the legal right to note and deed of trust would be in
plaintiff.
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4. "The judgment of foreclosure must be reversed for the further
reason that it is not based on a cause of action arising out of the transaction set forth in the complaint, as required by Section 63 of the Code.
The complaint was in tort for conversion. The cross-complaint was
based on contract." A demand founded on contract cannot be set off
against damages proved in an action for conversion.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Knous concur.
FRAUD AND DECEIT-CONTRACTS-RESCISSION-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-LACHES-Hall vs. Bankers Trust Company-No.

13993-Decided November 22, 1937-District Court of Denver
-Hon. Charles C. Sackmann, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: In 1921, plaintiff paid moneys to defendant. He claims
that in 1934 he discovered the fraud of the defendant which caused him
to pay the money to the defendant in 1921. He brings suit to recover
the money so paid, not on the theory of fraud and deceit, but on theory
of rescission of the contract. Defendant demurred generally and specially. They were sustained and the case dismissed.
HELD: 1. The six-year statute of limitations begins to run, not
when the money is paid over, but either when plaintiff discovered fraud
upon which he based his rescission of the contract, or at the time of
rescission. In this case that statute is no bar regardless of which date is
used.
2. The three-year statute of limitations does not apply, for this
is not a bill for relief on the ground of fraud. If it did apply, "the
period during which the statute could have run would plainly be less
than three years and so too short to constitute a bar thereunder."
3. The statute of limitations relating to trusts is inapplicable
here.
4. Laches is a defense which must be affirmatively pleaded. EN
BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DISABILITY-MEASURING DEGREEPlatt-Rogers, Inc., et al. vs. Industrial Commission, et al.-No.
14158-Decided November 22, 1937-District Court of Den'er
-Hon. Otto Bock, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. Where it does not appear, from the record, that corrective measures would in any appreciable degree enhance the working
power of the particular employee beyond what it is without correction,
in determining the degree of loss of vision, under a claim within the
workmen's compensation act, the vision is not to be measured with the
aid of corrective glasses. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
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DEWATER RIGHTS - PLEADINGINJUNCTION AND DAMAGESPARTURE-EVIDENCE-Young vs. Corey, et al.-No. 14170-

Decided November 22, 1937-DistrictCourt of Montrose County
-Hon. George W. Bruce, Judge-Alfirmed.
FACTS: Suit brought for injunction and damages alleging defendant had interfered with plaintiff's irrigation rights.
HELD: 1. The contention that the complaint does not contain
a cause of action because the primary trespass complained of occurred
before plaintiffs acquired title is without merit, since the trespass was in
fact and of necessity a continuing one.
2. Where both parties in subsequent suit pray for identical relief,
the objection by one party that property rights are involved and that
they had been adjudicated in the previous suit, is waived.
3.
"Since it first appeared by answer that defendant claimed
through interests presumably foreclosed by the decree in question, no
occasion to invoke it appeared prior to reply, and it was, of course,
proper there."
4. Failure to formally introduce the decree in evidence is not vital
where the judgment was in the same court, and had been pleaded, and
where the record discloses no objection, and where it does not appear
that court gave it any consideration.
5.
Evidence considered and found sufficient to support trial court's
judgment.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice Holland concur.

EQUITY-EXCESSIVE DAMAGES AND VERDICTS-CHANGING OF VERDICT BY THE JUDGE-JURIES--TRIALS-WITNESSES-Fnch vs.

McCrimmon-No. 14121-Decided April 4, 1937-District
Court of Montrose County-Hon. John I. Palmer, JudgeReversed.
FACTS: Originally this was a suit by McCrimmon, administrator
of the estate of Clark, defendant in error here, to recover from Finch,
daughter of Clark, for allegedly wrongfully withholding certain property belonging to the estate. The judgment went against Mrs. Finch,
but she was allowed compensation for the care of her father during the
protracted illness preceding his death. Mrs. Finch died, and the administrator of her estate, L. J. Finch, was substituted in the litigation in her
place and stead. On trial to a jury, a verdict was returned for Mrs.
Finch in the sum of $9,698. In a motion for a new trial, the representative of the estate urged that the verdict was excessive. The court did not
pass on the motion. Instead, predicating determination on the theory
that the proceeding was in equity, it ignored both verdict and motion for
new trial, and, sitting as in chancery, fixed the amount of recovery at its
own appraisement-$4,217.71, and adjudged in that sum.
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HELD: 1. Only the issue of the amount of Mrs. Finch's claim
against her father's estate remained to be tried. That issue was properly
submitted to a jury, and its verdict, subject to challenge on motion for
new trial, was decisive.
2. The plaintiff being called and cross-examined by her adversary
at suit, removes the bar and makes plaintiff a competent witness for all
purposes.
3.
The competency of a witness established at one trial obtains at
subsequent trials of the same cause.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Bakke concur.
TRUSTS-REAL PROPERTY-Beatty v. Fellows-No. 14089-Decided

November 29, 1937-District Court of Denver, Hon. Charles C.
Sackmann, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS:
B sued F in an action termed "an action to impress a
trust" upon a certain strip of real estate. The trial court found in favor
of F and dismissed the action. F derived title from "J. B. Rush, Trustee," by quit-claim deed in 1935. In 1929, B entered into a contract
with Rush, F's grantor, to transact the purchase and sale of certain
property, not including the strip. No decree reforming the contract to
include the strip was ever obtained. Rush, under the contract, was "to
assume the responsibility of the sale or development of said property."
B was only to finance the purchase.
HELD:
1. If the confidence of one person in another is abused,
a suit may be brought for redress; but where the wrong, if any, is
chargeable to one, not a party to the suit, and the suit is brought against
the latter's grantee, the trial court properly dismissed the action.
2. In the light of Rush's plenary authority, there could be no
constructive or resulting trust in favor of B.
3. The addition of the word "Trustee" to the signature signified
nothing, for the word was purely description of the person.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Young concur.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-FACT FINDING AUTHORITY OF THE
COMMISSION-London Gold Mines Co., et al. v. Custer-No.

14245-Decided November 29, 1937-DistrictCourt of Denver,
Hon. George F. Dunhlee, Judge-Reversed.
HELD:
1. Where it appears that there was ample testimony
before the commission to support its findings that the claimant's disability was not due to industrial accident, but was caused by a ruptured
artery which would have occurred regardless of claimant's employment,
the finding of the-commission on conflicting evidence will not be interfered with by the courts.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice Holland concur.
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CRIMINAL LAW-SALE OF BAD EGGS FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION-

REPEAL OF STATUTE BY IMPLICATION-PURE FOOD LAWPLEADING-Ferch v. People-No. 14202-Decided November

29, 1937--County Court of Denver, Hon. Homer G. Preston,
Judge-Judgment Modified and Affirmed.
FACTS: Defendant convicted of selling for human consumption,
eggs unfit for human use. On appeal, he claims that the statute under
which he was convicted had been repealed by implication, and offers as
proof of this that he was fined $50 for first offense, whereas, the new
statute imposes a $25 maximum fine for first offense.
HELD: 1. The law does not favor repeal of statutes by implication: and repeals by implication are never upheld unless there is a repugnancy or an irreconcilable conflict between the statutes under consideration. There is no such conflict between paragraph "Sixth," Sec. 7, Ch.

69, 1935 C. S. A. (1001 C. L. 1921), and Sec. 12, Chapter 128, 1935
C. S. A. (S. L. 1933, p. 774, Sec. 2).
2. A pure food act relating to food in general is not necessarily
repugnant to an act relating to a specific food product.
3.
"For Sale" includes " 'all articles, compound or single, not
intended for consumption by the producer.' "
4. "Assuming that an attempted charge under the Pure Food
and Drug Act was void, that did not nullify the warrant where it stated
an offense under a valid statute. The affidavit and warrant must be
construed together."
5. Motions to quash the complaint or information must be in
writing.
6. The later statute is determinative of the fine and the trial court
is directed to reduce the fine to not to exceed $25.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland concur.
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